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This paper examines the evidence on the relationship between credit spreads and economic activity.
Using an extensive data set of prices of outstanding corporate bonds trading in the secondary market,
we construct a credit spread index that is—compared with the standard default-risk indicators—a considerably
more powerful predictor of economic activity. Using an empirical framework, we decompose our index
into a predictable component that captures the available firm-specific information on expected defaults
and a residual component—the excess bond premium. Our results indicate that the predictive content
of credit spreads is due primarily to movements in the excess bond premium. Innovations in the excess
bond premium that are orthogonal to the current state of the economy are shown to lead to significant
declines in economic activity and equity prices. We also show that during the 2007–09 financial crisis,
a deterioration in the creditworthiness of broker-dealers—key financial intermediaries in the corporate
cash market—led to an increase in the excess bond premium. These find- ings support the notion that
a rise in the excess bond premium represents a reduction in the effective risk-bearing capacity of the
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Between the summer of 2007 and the spring of 2009, the U.S. economy was gripped by an
acute liquidity and credit crunch, by all accounts, the most severe ﬁnancial crisis since the
Great Depression. Throughout this period of extreme ﬁnancial turmoil, credit spreads—the
di erence in yields between various private debt instruments and government securities of
comparable maturity—served as a crucial gauge of the degree of strains in the ﬁnancial sys-
tem. In addition, movements in credit spreads were thought toc o n t a i ni m p o r t a n ts i g n a l s
regarding the evolution of the real economy and risks to the economic outlook, a view sup-
ported by the insights from the large literature on the predictive content of credit spreads—or
asset prices more generally—for economic activity.1
The focus on credit spreads is motivated, in part, by theoriest h a td e p a r tf r o mt h e
Modigliani and Miller [1958] paradigm of frictionless ﬁnancial markets, theories that empha-
size linkages between the quality of borrowers’ balance sheets and their access to external
ﬁnance. Fluctuations in credit spreads may also reﬂect shifts in the e ective supply of funds
o ered by ﬁnancial intermediaries, which, in the presence ofﬁ n a n c i a lm a r k e tf r i c t i o n s ,h a v e
important implications for the usefulness of credit spreadsa sp r e d i c t o r so fe c o n o m i ca c t i v i t y .
In the latter case, a deterioration in the capital position ofﬁ n a n c i a li n t e r m e d i a r i e sl e a d st o
ar e d u c t i o ni nt h es u p p l yo fc r e d i t ,c a u s i n ga ni n c r e a s ei nt h ec o s to fd e b tﬁ n a n c e — t h e
widening of credit spreads—and a subsequent reduction in spending and production.
In this paper, we examine the relationship between corporateb o n dc r e d i ts p r e a d sa n d
economic activity. To do so, we ﬁrst construct a new credit spread index—the “GZ credit
spread”—that has considerable predictive power for economic activity over the 1973–2010
period. Our approach builds on the recent work of Gilchrist eta l .[ 2 0 0 9 ] ,i nt h a tw eu s ep r i c e s
of individual corporate bonds traded in the secondary markett oc o n s t r u c tt h i sh i g h l yi n f o r -
mative ﬁnancial indicator. According to our results, the predictive ability of the GZ credit
spread for future economic activity signiﬁcantly exceeds that of the widely-used default-risk
indicators such as the standard Baa–Aaa corporate bond credits p r e a da n dt h e“ p a p e r - b i l l ”
spread.
As shown by Philippon [2009], the predictive content of corporate bond credit spreads for
1Financial indicators considered in this vast literature include stock prices (Fama [1981]); spreads
between long- and short-term risk-free interest rates (Harvey [1988]; Estrella and Hardouvelis [1991];
Estrella and Mishkin [1998]; and Hamilton and Kim [2002]); the Treasury term structure more generally
(Ang et al. [2006]); spreads between rates on short-term commercial paper and rates on Treasury bills
(Friedman and Kuttner [1992, 1998]; and Emery [1999]); and yield spreads on longer-term corporate debt
(Gertler and Lown [1999]; Mueller [2009]; Gilchrist et al. [2009]; and Faust et al. [2011]).
1economic activity could reﬂect—absent any ﬁnancial market frictions—the ability of the bond
market to signal more accurately than the stock market a decline in economic fundamentals
prior to a cyclical downturn. To address this issue, we use an empirical credit-spread pricing
framework to decompose the GZ spread into two components: a component capturing the
usual countercyclical movements in expected defaults and a component representing the
cyclical changes in the relationship between default risk and credit spreads—the so-called
excess bond premium.
The decomposition is motivated in part by the existence of the“ c r e d i ts p r e a dp u z z l e , ”t h e
well-known result from the corporate ﬁnance literature, showing that less than one-half of
the variation in corporate bond credit spreads can be attributed to the ﬁnancial health of the
issuer (e.g., Elton et al. [2001]). As shown by Collin-Dufresne et al. [2001], Houwelling et al.
[2005], and Driessen [2005], the unexplained portion of the variation in credit spreads appears
to reﬂect some combination of time-varying liquidity premium, the tax treatment of corporate
bonds, and most importantly, a default-risk factor that captures compensation demanded
by investors—above and beyond expected losses—for bearing exposure to corporate credit
risk.
Our results indicate that a substantial portion of the information content of the GZ credit
spread for economic activity can be attributed to deviationsi nt h ep r i c i n go fc o r p o r a t eb o n d s
relative to the expected default risk of the issuer. We examine the macroeconomic implica-
tions of this ﬁnding using an identiﬁed vector autoregression (VAR) framework. According
to our analysis, shocks to the excess bond premium that are orthogonal to the current state
of the economy lead to economically and statistically signiﬁcant declines in consumption,
investment, and output, as well as to appreciable disinﬂation. Monetary policy is eased
signiﬁcantly in response to these adverse economic developments, and despite the decline in
long-term Treasury yields, such shocks cause a sharp fall in the broad stock market.
To provide an interpretation for these “ﬁnancial disruptions” in the context of the 2007–
09 crisis, we examine how shocks to the proﬁtability of primary dealers—the highly leveraged
ﬁnancial institutions that play a key role in the corporate cash market—a ect credit supply
conditions as measured by the excess bond premium. Our results indicate that an adverse
shock to the equity valuations of these intermediaries—relative to the market return—leads
to an immediate and persistent increase in their credit default swap (CDS) premiums, a
response that is mirrored in an almost one-to-one basis by an increase in the excess bond
premium.
The conﬂuence of our results is thus consistent with the notion that an increase in the
2excess bond premium reﬂects a reduction in the e ective risk-bearing capacity of the ﬁnancial
sector and, as a result, a contraction in the supply of credit.C o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h eﬁ n a n c i a l
accelerator mechanisms emphasized by Bernanke and Gertler [1989], Kiyotaki and Moore
[1997], Bernanke et al. [1999], and Hall [2010], this reduction in credit availability augurs
ac h a n g ei nﬁ n a n c i a lc o n d i t i o n sw i t hs i g n i ﬁ c a n ta d v e r s ec o n sequences for macroeconomic
outcomes.
2A H i g h - I n f o r m a t i o n C o n t e n t C r e d i t S p r e a d I n d e x
Academics, business economists, and policymakers have long relied on credit spreads to
gauge the degree of strains in the ﬁnancial system. In addition, market participants view
these default-risk indicators as particularly useful for extracting investors’ expectations of
future economic outcomes, though obtaining an accurate reading of this information can be
complicated by the presence of time-varying risk premiums. In this paper, we employ the
“bottom-up” approach used by Gilchrist et al. [2009] to construct a credit spread index with
ah i g h - i n f o r m a t i o nc o n t e n tf o rf u t u r ee c o n o m i cd e v e l o p m e n ts. Importantly, we extend the
time span of the analysis back to the mid-1970s, thereby covering an appreciably greater
number of business cycles, a consideration of particular importance when one is evaluating
the predictive ability of ﬁnancial indicators for economic activity.
2.1 Data Sources and Methods
For a sample of U.S. nonﬁnancial ﬁrms covered by the S&P’s Compustat and the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), we obtained month-end secondary market prices of their
outstanding securities from the Lehman/Warga and Merrill Lynch databases.2 To ensure
that we are measuring borrowing costs of di erent ﬁrms at the same point in their capital
structure, we limited our sample to senior unsecured issues with a ﬁxed coupon schedule
only.
The micro-level aspect of our data allows us to construct credit spreads that are not
subject to the “duration mismatch” that plagues the standardc r e d i ts p r e a di n d e x e s .W ed o
so by constructing a synthetic risk-free security that mimics exactly the cash-ﬂows of the
corresponding corporate debt instrument. Speciﬁcally, consider a corporate bond k issued by
ﬁrm i that at time t is promising a sequence of cash-ﬂows {C(s):s =1 ,2,...,S},c o n s i s t i n g
2These two data sources include secondary market prices for a vast majority of dollar-denominated bonds
publicly issued in the U.S. corporate cash market; see Gilchrist et al. [2009] for details.
3of the regular coupon payments and the repayment of the principle at maturity. The price





where D(t)=e rtt is the discount function in period t.T o c a l c u l a t e t h e p r i c e o f t h e
corresponding risk-free security—denoted by P
f
t [k]—we discount the cash-ﬂow sequence
{C(s):s =1 ,2,...,S} using continuously-compounded zero-coupon Treasury yields in
period t, obtained from the U.S. Treasury yield curve estimated daily by G¨ urkaynak et al.
[2007]. The resulting price P
f
t [k]c a nt h e nb eu s e dt oc a l c u l a t et h ey i e l d — d e n o t e db yy
f
t [k]—
of a hypothetical Treasury security with exactly the same cash-ﬂows as the underlying cor-
porate bond. The resulting credit spread Sit[k]=yit[k] y
f
t [k], where yit[k]d e n o t e st h ey i e l d
of the corporate bond k,i st h u sf r e eo ft h eb i a st h a tw o u l do c c u rw e r et h es p r e a d sc o m puted
simply by matching the corporate yield to the estimated yieldo faT r e a s u r ys e c u r i t yo ft h e
same maturity.
To ensure that our results are not driven by a small number of extreme observations,
we eliminated all observations with credit spreads below 5 basis points and greater than
3,500 basis points. In addition, we dropped from our sample very small corporate issues
(par value of less than $1m i l l i o n )a n da l lo b s e r v a t i o n sw i t har e m a i n i n gt e r m - t o - m a turity
of less than one year or more than 30 years. These selection criteria yielded a sample of
5,982 individual securities for the period between January 1973 and September 2010. We
matched these corporate securities with their issuer’s quarterly income and balance sheet
data from Compustat and daily data on equity valuations from CRSP, yielding a matched
sample of 1,112 ﬁrms.
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the key characteristics of bonds in our sample.
Note that a typical ﬁrm in our sample has only a few senior unsecured issues outstanding at
any point in time—the median ﬁrm, for example, has two such issues trading in any given
month. This distribution, however, exhibits a signiﬁcant positive skew, as some ﬁrms can
have many more issues trading in the secondary market at a point in time.
The distribution of the market values of these issues is similarly skewed, with the range
running from $1.2 million to more than $5.6 billion. The maturity of these debt instruments
is fairly long, with the average maturity at issue of 13 years;t h ea v e r a g er e m a i n i n gt e r m - t o -
maturity in our sample is 11.3 years. However, because corporate bonds typically generate
signiﬁcant cash ﬂows in the form of regular coupon payments, their duration is considerably
shorter.
4Table 1: Summary Statistics of Corporate Bond Characteristics
Variable Mean SD Min P50 Max
No. of bonds per ﬁrm/month 2.91 3.64 1.00 2.00 74.0
Mkt. value of issue ($mil.)a 322.9 326.6 1.22 238.6 5,628
Maturity at issue (yrs.) 13.0 9.3 1.0 10.0 50.0
Term to maturity (yrs.) 11.3 8.5 1.0 8.1 30.0
Duration (years) 6.47 3.20 0.91 6.06 16.0
Callable (pct.) 67.2 47.0 - - -
Credit rating (S&P) - - D BBB1 AAA
Coupon rate (pct.) 7.34 1.99 1.80 7.00 17.5
Nominal e ective yield (pct.) 7.68 3.24 0.54 7.16 44.3
Credit spread (bps.) 204 281 5 118 3,499
Note:S a m p l e p e r i o d :1 9 7 3 : M 1 – 2 0 1 0 : M 9 ; O b s . = 3 4 6 , 1 2 6 ; N o . o f b o n ds = 5,982; No. of
ﬁrms = 1,112. Sample statistics are based on trimmed data (seet e x tf o rd e t a i l s ) .
a Market value of the outstanding issue deﬂated by the CPI (1982–84 = 100).
An important characteristic of our sample is the fact that about two thirds of the securities
are callable—that is, the issuer has the right to “call” (i.e., redeem) the bond issue prior
to its maturity under certain pre-speciﬁed conditions. Moreover, the share of callable debt
in the secondary market has varied substantially over the sample period, with almost all
bonds being subject to a call provision until the late 1980s. Likely spurred by the decline in
long-term nominal interest rates and the accompanied reduction in interest rate volatility,
the share of callable debt fell to its historic low of about 25 percent by the mid-1990s.
However, over the past decade and a half, this trend has been almost completely reversed,
as nonﬁnancial ﬁrms resumed issuing large amounts of callable senior unsecured debt.
In terms of default risk—at least as measured by the S&P creditr a t i n g s — o u rs a m p l e
spans the entire spectrum of credit quality, from “single D” to “triple A.” At “BBB1,”
however, the median observation is still solidly in the investment-grade category. An average
bond has an expected return of 204 basis points above the comparable risk-free rate, while
the sizable standard deviation of 281 basis points reﬂects the wide range of credit quality in
our sample.
Using this micro-level data set, we construct a simple credit spread index that is repre-
sentative of the entire maturity spectrum and the range of credit quality in the corporate











5Figure 1: Selected Corporate Credit Spreads
















Note:S a m p l e p e r i o d :1 9 7 3 : M 1 – 2 0 1 0 : M 9 . T h e ﬁ g u r e d e p i c t s t h e f o l lowing credit spreads:
GZ spread = the average credit spread on senior unsecured bonds issued by nonﬁnancial ﬁrms in
our sample (the solid line); Baa–Aaa = the spread between yields on Baa- and Aaa-rated long-term
industrial corporate bonds (the dashed line); and CP–Bill = the spread between the yield on 1-month
A1/P1 nonﬁnancial commercial paper and the 1-month Treasuryy i e l d( t h ed o t t e dl i n e ) .T h es h a d e d
vertical bars represent the NBER-dated recessions.
where Nt is the number of bond/ﬁrm observations in month t—that is, the GZ credit spread is
simply an arithmetic average of the credit spreads on outstanding bonds in any given month.
Figure 1 shows the GZ credit spread along with two widely-usedd e f a u l t - r i s ki n d i c a t o r st h a t
are also available over our sample period: the spread betweeny i e l d so ni n d e x e so fB a a -
and Aaa-rated seasoned industrial corporate bonds, and the yield spread between 1-month
A1/P1-rated nonﬁnancial commercial paper and the 1-month Treasury yield (the paper-bill
spread).3
All three credit spreads are clearly countercyclical, risingp r i o rt oa n dd u r i n ge c o n o m i c
downturns. Nonetheless, the pair-wise correlations betweent h et h r e es e r i e sa r ef a i r l ys m a l l
and do not exhibit much of a systematic pattern. For example, the correlation between
the paper-bill and the Baa–Aaa spread is 0.21, whereas the paper-bill and the GZ spread
are slightly negatively correlated, with the correlation coe cient of  0.17. Perhaps not too
surprising, the highest correlation, 0.38, is between the two corporate bond credit spread
3Other than than the GZ credit spread, all yields are taken fromt h e“ S e l e c t e dI n t e r e s tR a t e s ”( H . 1 5 )
statistical release published by the Federal Reserve Board.
6indexes. Regarding their variability, the Baa–Aaa and the paper-bill spreads are the least
volatile, with the standard deviations of 50 and 67 basis points, respectively. Reﬂecting its
broader coverage, both in terms of credit quality and maturity, the standard deviation of
the GZ credit spread—at about 100 basis points—is considerably higher.
3C r e d i t S p r e a d s a n d E c o n o m i c A c t i v i t y
To assess the predictive ability of credit spreads for economic activity (denoted by Yt), we
estimate the following univariate forecasting speciﬁcation:
 
hYt+h =   +
p  
i=1
 i Yt i +  1TSt +  2RFF t +  3CSt +  t+h, (2)






, h   0i st h ef o r e c a s th o r i z o n ,a n dc is a scaling constant
that depends on the frequency of the data (i.e., c =1 ,200 for monthly data and c =4 0 0
for quarterly data). In the forecasting regression (2), TSt denotes the “term spread”—that
is, the slope of the Treasury yield curve, deﬁned as the di erence between the three-month
constant-maturity Treasury yield and the 10-year constant-maturity yield; RFF t denotes the
real federal funds rate; CSt denotes a credit spread; and  t+h is the forecast error. Thus, our
framework examines the marginal information content of credit spreads conditional on the
slope of the yield curve and the real federal funds rate, two key indicators of the stance of
monetary policy.4
The timing adopted by this speciﬁcation allows for the possibility of “nowcasting” (i.e.,
h =0 ) ,a n di ti si n t e n d e dt oc a p t u r et h ef a c tt h a tw h e nf o r e c a s t ing an indicator of economic
activity in period t,e c o n o m i s t s ,b e c a u s eo fr e p o r t i n gl a g s ,t y p i c a l l yd on o to b serve the
current value of the indicator, while the current ﬁnancial asset prices are readily available.
The forecasting regression (2) is estimated by OLS, with the lag length p of each speciﬁcation
determined by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). For the forecasting horizons h   1,
the MA(h)s t r u c t u r eo ft h ee r r o rt e r m t+h induced by overlapping observations is taken into
account by computing standard errors according to Hodrick [1992].5
4The real federal funds rate in period t is deﬁned as the average e ective federal funds rate during period t
less realized inﬂation, where realized inﬂation is given by the log-di erence between the core PCE price index
in period t   1a n di t sl a g g e dv a l u eay e a re a r l i e r .
5As shown by Ang and Bekaert [2007], the standard errors developed by Hodrick [1992] retain the correct
size even in relatively small samples when testing the null ofn op r e d i c t a b i l i t yi nt h ec o n t e x to fo v e r l a p p i n g
observations.
7We ﬁrst analyze the information content of the three credit spreads shown in Figure 1
for key monthly indicators of economic activity: the growth of private (nonfarm) payroll
employment, the change in the civilian unemployment rate, and the growth of manufacturing
industrial production. (In the case of the unemployment rate, the transformation  h does
not involve logs.) Using quarterly data, we also consider the predictive content of these
default-risk indicators for the growth of real GDP, the broadest measure of economic activity.
3.1 Forecasting Results
The results in Table 2 detail the predictive power of various ﬁnancial indicators for the three
monthly measures of economic activity. We focus on the 3- and 12-month ahead forecast
horizons and report standardized estimates of the coe cients associated with the ﬁnancial
indicators, as well as the in-sample goodness-of-ﬁt as measured by the adjusted R2.
The ﬁrst column in each subpanel of the table contains the results from our baseline
speciﬁcation, which includes the term spread and the real federal funds rate, along with p lags
of  Yt 1,a sp r e d i c t o r s .I nl i n ew i t hp r e v i o u sﬁ n d i n g s ,t h es l o p eo ft he Treasury yield curve
has signiﬁcant predictive content for all three economic indicators at both forecast horizons,
with a ﬂat or inverted yield curve signaling a deterioration in labor market conditions and a
deceleration in industrial output. The real federal funds rate has some additional predictive
power for changes in the labor market conditions at the 12-month forecast horizon, but it
has no explanatory power for the growth of industrial production at either horizon.
The remaining three columns contain the results from our baseline speciﬁcation aug-
mented with the three default-risk indicators. The paper-bill spread forecasts all three mea-
sures of economic activity, though the addition of this spread leads to only a small increase in
the adjusted R2 relative to the baseline speciﬁcation. The forecasting ability of the Baa–Aaa
credit spread appears to be equally modest; although the Baa–Aaa spread contains some
marginal information for near-term economic developments,a tt h ey e a r - a h e a dh o r i z o n ,t h i s
default-risk indicator has statistically signiﬁcant, but economically negligible, explanatory
power only for changes in the unemployment rate.
In contrast to the results obtained with the two standard default-risk indicators, the
GZ credit spread is statistically a highly signiﬁcant predictor of all three measures of eco-
nomic activity at both the short and longer-term horizons. Moreover, the magnitude of
the estimated coe cients implies an economically signiﬁcant negative relationship between
credit spreads and future economic activity. For example, ani n c r e a s eo f1 0 0b a s i sp o i n ti n
the GZ credit spread in month t implies an almost 3.0 percentage points (annualized) drop
8Table 2: Financial Indicators and Monthly Measures of Economic Activity
Forecast Horizon: 3 months
Financial Indicator Payroll Employment Unemployment Rate Industrial Production
Term spread -0.096 -0.102 -0.110 -0.110 0.164 0.179 0.215 0.199 -0.182 -0.202 -0.239 -0.224
[2.12] [2.27] [2.44] [2.42] [7.71] [8.42] [10.2] [9.37] [2.54] [2.83] [3.43] [3.15]
Real FFR -0.058 0.050 -0.038 -0.113 0.029 -0.152 -0.024 0.107 -0.035 0.183 0.016 -0.126
[1.18] [0.78] [0.75] [2.23] [1.24] [5.22] [1.06] [4.50] [0.44] [1.86] [0.20] [1.62]
CP–Bill spread - -0.165 - - -0 . 2 6 8 - - -- 0 . 3 3 2- -
[3.80] [13.8] [4.75]
Baa–Aaa spread - - -0.075 - -- 0 . 1 9 8 --- - 0 . 2 1 1 -
[2.05] [10.4] [3.08]
GZ spread - - - -0.322 --- 0 . 3 5 1 --- - 0 . 3 8 6
[8.50] [19.5] [5.28]
Adj. R2 0.622 0.639 0.625 0.685 0.335 0.378 0.362 0.425 0.251 0.319 0.283 0.360
Forecast Horizon: 12 months
Financial Indicator Payroll Employment Unemployment Rate Industrial Production
Term spread -0.252 -0.255 -0.241 -0.277 0.375 0.386 0.394 0.419 -0.358 -0.371 -0.357 -0.400
[4.94] [5.05] [4.93] [5.53] [46.7] [48.4] [50.6] [51.8] [4.03] [4.91] [4.06] [4.59]
Real FFR -0.116 -0.064 -0.129 -0.204 0.037 -0.089 0.019 0.131 -0.094 0.052 -0.095 -0.175
[2.10] [0.96] [2.45] [3.84] [4.60] [9.72] [2.45] [16.4] [0.98] [0.48] [1.02] [1.90]
CP–Bill spread - -0.080 - - -0 . 1 9 1 - - -- 0 . 2 2 6- -
[2.29] [36.0] [3.67]
Baa–Aaa spread - - 0.054 - -- 0 . 0 7 4 --- 0 . 0 0 4 -
[1.15] [11.2] [0.05]
GZ spread - - - -0.497 --- 0 . 4 5 3 --- - 0 . 4 1 2
[13.4] [83.0] [5.11]
Adj. R2 0.422 0.424 0.422 0.579 0.270 0.292 0.273 0.417 0.227 0.258 0.225 0.346
Note:S a m p l ep e r i o d :1 9 7 3 : M 1 – 2 0 1 0 : M 9 .D e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l ei s hYt+h,w h e r eYt denotes an indicator of economic activity in month t and h
is the forecast horizon. In addition to the speciﬁed ﬁnanciali n d i c a t o ri nm o n t ht,e a c hs p e c i ﬁ c a t i o na l s oi n c l u d e sac o n s t a n ta n dp lags of  Yt 1
(not reported), where p is determined by the AIC. Entries in the table denote the standardized estimates of the OLS coe cients associated with
each ﬁnancial indicator; absolute asymptotic t-statistics reported in brackets are computed according to Hodrick [1992] (see text for details).
9Table 3: Financial Indicators and Real GDP
Financial Indicator Forecast Horizon: 1 quarter Forecast Horizon: 4 quarters
Term spread -0.198 -0.217 -0.250 -0.247 -0.398 -0.406 -0.413 -0.460
[1.77] [1.92] [2.07] [2.26] [2.79] [2.81] [2.70] [3.22]
Real FFR -0.016 0.175 0.020 -0.123 -0.036 0.042 -0.026 -0.131
[0.12] [1.12] [0.15] [0.95] [0.24] [0.22] [0.17] [0.87]
CP-bill spread - -0.254 - - -- 0 . 1 0 5- -
[2.16] [0.82]
Baa–Aaa spread - - -0.229 - -- - 0 . 0 6 6 -
[1.95] [0.52]
GZ spread - - - -0.437 --- - 0 . 4 8 2
[4.96] [5.74]
Adj. R2 0.170 0.197 0.209 0.313 0.215 0.215 0.213 0.369
Note:S a m p l ep e r i o d :1 9 7 3 : Q 1 – 2 0 1 0 : Q 3 .D e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l ei s hYt+h,w h e r eYt denotes the real GDP
in quarter t and h is the forecast horizon. In addition to the speciﬁed ﬁnanciali n d i c a t o ri nq u a r t e rt,
each speciﬁcation also includes a constant and p lags of  Yt 1 (not reported), where p is determined by
the AIC. Entries in the table denote the standardized estimates of the OLS coe cients associated with
each ﬁnancial indicator; absolute asymptotic t-statistics reported in brackets are computed according to
Hodrick [1992] (see text for details).
in the growth rate of industrial output over the subsequent three months. Moreover, the
inclusion of the GZ spread in the predictor set yields sizablei m p r o v e m e n t si nt h ei n - s a m p l e
ﬁt, ranging—at the 12-month horizon—from 12 percentage points in the case of industrial
production to about 15 percentage points for the two labor market indicators.
Table 3 summarizes the predictive content of these ﬁnancial indicators for the growth
of real GDP. According to the entries in the table, the current stance of monetary policy
has no predictive power for the next quarter’s economic growth, although the term spread
is economically and statistically a highly signiﬁcant predictor of the year-ahead growth in
real output. Both the paper-bill and the Baa–Aaa spreads contain some information about
the near-term growth prospects, but the signaling ability oft h e s et w od e f a u l t - r i s ki n d i c a t o r s
vanishes at longer horizons. In contrast, the GZ credit spread is a highly signiﬁcant predictor
of real GDP growth at both the 1- and 4-quarter forecast horizons, with an increase of
100 basis points in the GZ credit spread in quarter t leading to a deceleration in real GDP
of more than 1.25 percentage points over the subsequent four quarters.
4T h e E x c e s s B o n d P r e m i u m
In this section, we exploit the micro-level aspect of the datat od e c o m p o s eo u rh i g h -
information content credit spread index into two components: a component that captures
10the systematic movements in default risk of individual ﬁrms and a residual component—the
excess bond premium—which we argue below plausibly represents variation in the average
price of bearing exposure to U.S. corporate credit risk, abovea n db e y o n dt h ec o m p e n s a t i o n
for expected defaults.
Our empirical methodology is related to the recent work of Berndt et al. [2008], in that
the log of the credit spread on bond k (issued by ﬁrm i)a tt i m et is assumed to be related
linearly to a ﬁrm-speciﬁc measure of expected default DFT it and a vector of bond-speciﬁc
characteristics Zit[k], according to
lnSit[k]= DFTit +  
 Zit[k]+ it[k]; (3)
where the zero-mean disturbance  it[k]r e p r e s e n t sa“ p r i c i n g ”e r r o r . 6 The credit-spread
regression (3) is estimated by OLS, and the standard errors are double-clustered in the
ﬁrm (i)a n dt i m e( t)d i m e n s i o n sa n dt h u sa r er o b u s tt ob o t hc r o s s - s e c t i o n a ld e p endence and
serial correlation (cf. Cameron et al. [2011]).
Assuming normally distributed disturbances, the predicted level of the spread for bond k
of ﬁrm i at time t is given by
  Sit[k]=e x p
 






where (ˆ  ,ˆ   )d e n o t e st h eO L Se s t i m a t e so ft h ec o r r e s p o n d i n gp a r a m e t e r sand ˆ  2 is the
estimated variance of the disturbance term  it[k]. By averaging across bonds/ﬁrms at time t,











The excess bond premium in period t is then deﬁned by the following linear decomposition:
EBPt = S
GZ
t     S
GZ
t .
Within this framework, we are interested in determining the extent to which the forecasting
power of the GZ credit spread is due to the information contento ft h ee x p e c t e dd e f a u l t
component (  S
GZ)v e r s u sm o v e m e n t si nt h ee x c e s sb o n dp r e m i u m( EBP ).
6Taking logs of credit spreads provides a useful transformation to control for heteroscedasticity, given
that the distribution of credit spreads is highly skewed.
114.1 Measuring Default Risk
To measure a ﬁrm’s probability of default at each point in time, we employ the “distance-to-
default” (DD) framework developed in the seminal work of Merton [1974]. The key insight
of this contingent claims approach to corporate credit risk is that the equity of the ﬁrm can
be viewed as a call option on the underlying value of the ﬁrm with a strike price equal to
the face value of the ﬁrm’s debt. Although neither the underlying value of the ﬁrm nor its
volatility can be directly observed, they can, under the assumptions of the model, be inferred
from the value of the ﬁrm’s equity, the volatility of its equity, and the ﬁrm’s observed capital
structure.
While used widely by the ﬁnancial industry, our choice of the Merton framework is also
motivated by the work of Schaefer and Strebulaev [2008], who present compelling micro-
level evidence showing that even the simplest structural default model—the DD-model with
nonstochastic interest rates—accounts well for the default-risk component of corporate bond
prices. In particular, such models generate sensitivities (i.e., hedge ratios) of corporate bond
returns to the issuing ﬁrm’s equity and riskless bond returnst h a ta r er e m a r k a b l yc o n s i s t e n t
with those observed in the actual data.
The ﬁrst assumption underlying the DD-framework is that the total value of the ﬁrm V
follows a geometric Brownian motion:
dV = µVVd t+  VVd W , (4)
where µV denotes the expected continuously-compounded return on V ;  V is the volatility of
ﬁrm value; and dW is an increment of the standard Weiner process. The second assumption
pertains to the ﬁrm’s capital structure. In particular, it isa s s u m e dt h a tt h eﬁ r mh a sj u s t
issued a single discount bond in the amount D that will mature in T periods.
Together, these two assumption imply that the value of the ﬁrm’s equity E can be viewed
as a call option on the underlying value of the ﬁrm V ,w i t has t r i k ep r i c ee q u a lt ot h ef a c e
value of the ﬁrm’s debt D and a time-to-maturity of T. According to the Black-Scholes-
Merton option-pricing framework, the value of the ﬁrm’s equity then satisﬁes:
E = V  ( 1)   e
 rTD ( 2), (5)
where r denotes the instantaneous risk-free interest rate,  (·)i st h ec u m u l a t i v es t a n d a r d
12normal distribution function, and
 1 =






and  2 =  1    V
 
T.
According to equation (5), the value of the ﬁrm’s equity depends on the total value of
the ﬁrm and time, a relationship that also underpins the link between volatility of the ﬁrm’s









Because under the Black-Scholes-Merton option-pricing framework  E
 V =  (  1), the rela-







 ( 1) V. (7)
From an operational standpoint, the most critical inputs to the Merton DD-model are
clearly the market value of the equity E,t h ef a c ev a l u eo ft h ed e b tD,a n dt h ev o l a t i l i t y
of equity  E. Assuming a forecasting horizon of one year (i.e., T =1 ) ,w ei m p l e m e n tt h e
model in two steps: First, we estimate  E from historical daily stock returns using a 250-day
moving window. Second, we assume that the face value of the ﬁrm’s debt D is equal to
the sum of the ﬁrm’s current liabilities and one-half of its long-term liabilities.7 Using the
observed values of E, D,  E,a n dr (i.e., the daily 1-year constant-maturity Treasury yield),
equations (5) and (7) can be solved for V and  V using standard numerical techniques.
As emphasized by Vassalou and Xing [2004], for example, the excessive volatility of mar-
ket leverage (V/E)i ne q u a t i o n( 7 )c a u s e sl a r g es w i n g si nt h ee s t i m a t e dv o l a t i lity of the
ﬁrm’s value  V,w h i c ha r ed i   c u l tt or e c o n c i l ew i t ht h eo b s e r v e df r e q u e n c yof defaults and
movements in ﬁnancial asset prices. To resolve this problem,w ei m p l e m e n ta ni t e r a t i v e
procedure proposed by Bharath and Shumway [2008]. The procedure involves the following
steps: First, we initialize the procedure by letting  V =  E[D/(E + D)]. We then use this
value of  V in equation (5) to infer the market value of the ﬁrm’s assets V for every day of
the 250-day moving window. In the second step, we calculate the implied daily log-return
7This assumption for the “default point” is also used by Moody’s/KMV in the construction of their
Expected Default Frequencies (EDFs™), which are based on the DD-framework. The assumption captures
the notion that short-term debt requires a repayment of the principal relatively soon, whereas long-term
debt requires the ﬁrm to meet only the coupon payments. Both current and long-term liabilities are taken
from quarterly Compustat ﬁles and interpolated to daily frequency using a step function.
13Figure 2: Distance-to-Default
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Note:S a m p l ep e r i o d :1 9 7 3 : M 1 – 2 0 1 0 : M 9 .T h es o l i dl i n ed e p i c t st h e( w e i g h t e d )m e d i a nD Do ft h e
ﬁrms in our sample, and the shaded band depicts the corresponding (weighted) interquartile range.
The dotted line depicts the (weighted) median DD in the U.S. nonﬁnancial corporate sector; all
percentiles are weighted by the ﬁrm’s outstanding liabilities. The shaded vertical bars represent the
NBER-dated recessions.
on assets (i.e.,  lnV )a n du s et h er e s u l t i n gs e r i e st og e n e r a t en e we s t i m a t e so f V and µV.
We then iterate on  V until convergence.
The resulting solutions of the Merton DD-model can be used to calculate the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
DD over the one-year horizon as
DD =




In this context, default occurs when the ratio of the value of assets to debt in equation (8)
falls below one (or its log is negative); in e ect, distance-to-default measures the number of
standard deviations the log of this ratio must deviate from its mean for default to occur.
The implied probability of default is given by  ( DD), which, under the assumptions of the
model, should be a su cient statistic for predicting defaults.
Using this methodology, we compute the year-ahead DD for all U.S. nonﬁnancial corpo-
rations covered by the S&P’s Compustat and CRSP over our sample period. Figure 2 plots
the cross-sectional median and the interquartile range of the DD for the 1,112 bond issuers
in our sample. As a point of comparison, the ﬁgure also depicts the cross-sectional median
14of the DD for the entire Compustat-CRSP matched sample (14,458 ﬁrms) of nonﬁnancial
ﬁrms.8 The median DD for both sets of ﬁrms is strongly procyclical, implying that equity
investors generally expect an increase in defaults during economic downturns. Indeed, during
the height of the recent ﬁnancial crisis in the autumn of 2008,b o t hm e a s u r e sf e l lt or e c o r d
lows, a drop consistent with the jump in the GZ credit spread shown in Figure 1.
4.2 Credit Spreads and Default Risk
With our ﬁrm-speciﬁc measure of default risk in hand, we now turn to the estimation of the
credit-spread model given in equation (3). In our baseline speciﬁcation, we regress lnSit[k],
the logarithm of the credit spread on bond k (issued by ﬁrm i)i nm o n t ht,o nt h ed i s t a n c e -
to-default DD it,w h i l ea l s oc o n t r o l l i n gf o rb o n d - s p e c i ﬁ cc h a r a c t e r i s t i c sthat could inﬂuence
bond yields through either term or liquidity premiums. Thesep r e - d e t e r m i n e dc h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,
denoted by the vector Zit[k], include the bond’s duration (DUR it[k]), the amount outstanding
(PARit[k]), the (ﬁxed) coupon rate (CPNi[k]), the age of the issue (AGE it[k]), and an indicator
variable that equals one if the bond is callable and zero otherwise (CALLi[k]).
The regression also includes industry (3-digit NAICS) ﬁxed e ects to control for any
systematic (time-invariant) di erences in expected recovery rates across industries. Lastly,
the speciﬁcation includes credit rating (S&P) ﬁxed e ects, which capture the “soft infor-
mation” regarding the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial health, information that is complementary to our
option-theoretic measures of default risk (e.g., L¨ o er [2004, 2007]).9
According to Table 4, our market-based measure of default riski ss t a t i s t i c a l l yah i g h l y
signiﬁcant predictor of the log credit spreads. In economic terms, the estimated coe cient
on the distance-to-default implies that a decrease of one standard deviation in the year-
ahead DD leads to a widening of credit spreads of about 15 basis points. As evidenced
by the adjusted R2,t h eb a s e l i n ec r e d i t - s p r e a dm o d e le x p l a i n sac o n s i d e r a b l eportion of the
variation in the log credit spreads.
The distance-to-default should summarize all available information regarding the risk
of default, according to the Merton model, Consequently, movements in risk-free interest
rates should a ect credit spreads only insofar as they changee x p e c t e df u t u r ec a s hﬂ o w s
and, as a result, the distance-to-default. As shown by Du ee [1998], however, if the ﬁrm’s
8We eliminated from our sample all observations with the DD of less than  2o rm o r et h a n2 0 ,c u t o   s
corresponding roughly to the 1st and 99th percentiles of the DD distribution, respectively.
9We conducted sensitivity analysis by adding quadratic (and higher order) terms of the distance-to-
default to our baseline speciﬁcation in order to allow for a nonlinear e ect of leverage on credit spreads (e.g.,
Levin et al. [2004]). The inclusion of these terms, however, had virtually no e ect on any of our results.
15Table 4: Credit Spreads and the Distance-to-Default
Explanatory Variable Est. S.E. Est. S.E.
 DD it 0.075 0.005 0.093 0.005
ln(DUR it[k]) 0.106 0.018 0.201 0.019
ln(PARit[k]) 0.171 0.018 0.121 0.022
ln(CPNi[k]) 0.439 0.074 0.031 0.062
ln(AGE it[k]) 0.047 0.008 0.135 0.010
CALLi[k]0 . 2 6 2 0 . 0 2 9 -0.427 0.210
 DD it   CALLi[k]- - -0.030 0.004
ln(DUR it[k])   CALLi[k]- - -0.120 0.023
ln(PARit[k])   CALLi[k]- - -0.122 0.024
ln(CPNi[k])   CALLi[k]- - 0.915 0.078
ln(AGE it[k])   CALLi[k]- - -0.132 0.013
LEV t   CALLi[k]- - -0.385 0.027
SLPt   CALLi[k]- - -0.088 0.017
CRVt   CALLi[k]- - -0.041 0.019
VOLt   CALLi[k]- - 0.134 0.021
Adj. R2 0.649 0.700
Industry E ectsa 0.000 0.000
Credit Rating E ectsb 0.000 0.000
Note:S a m p l e p e r i o d :1 9 7 3 : M 1 – 2 0 1 0 : M 9 . O b s . = 3 4 6 , 1 2 6 ; N o . o f b o n ds/ﬁrms =
5,982/1,112. Dependent variable is ln(Sit[k]), the credit spread on bond k (issued by ﬁrm i)
in month t.T h e T r e a s u r y t e r m s t r u c t u r e i s r e p r e s e n t e d b y t h e f o l l o w i n gt h r e ef a c t o r s :
LEV t =l e v e l ;SLPt =s l o p e ;a n dCRVt =c u r v a t u r e .VOLt =( a n n u a l i z e d )r e a l i z e dm o n t h l y
volatility of the daily 10-year Treasury yield. Asymptotic standard errors are clustered in
both the ﬁrm (i)a n dt i m e( t)d i m e n s i o n s ,a c c o r d i n gt oC a m e r o ne ta l .[ 2 0 1 1 ] .
a p-value of the exclusion test of industry ﬁxed e ects.
b p-value of the exclusion test of credit rating ﬁxed e ects.
outstanding bonds are callable, then movements in the risk-free rates—by changing the value
of the embedded call option—will have an independent e ect onb o n dp r i c e s ,c o m p l i c a t i n g
the interpretation of the behavior of credit spreads. In addition, callable bonds are likely to
be more sensitive to uncertainty regarding the future courseo fi n t e r e s tr a t e s .O nt h eo t h e r
hand, to the extent that callable bonds are, in e ect, of shorter duration, they may be less
sensitive to changes in default risk.
One possible way to deal with this issue would be to conﬁne the analysis to a sub-sample
of noncallable bonds. However, as reported in Table 1, callable bonds account, on average, for
two-thirds of the senior unsecured corporate debt traded in the secondary market. Moreover,
given the variation in the share of callable debt over time, limiting the sample to noncallable
bonds would severely limit the time span of our data, making iti m p o s s i b l et os h e dm u c h
light on the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
16Table 5: Selected Marginal E ects by Type of Bond
Noncallable Callable
Explanatory Variable Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Meana STDb
Distance-to-default:  DD it 0.190 0.010 0.129 0.008 6.610 3.946
Term structure: LEV t -- -0.783 0.055 0.000 1.000
Term structure: SLPt -- -0.179 0.034 0.000 1.000
Term structure: CRVt -- -0.082 0.038 0.000 1.000
Term structure: VOLt (%) - - 0.273 0.043 1.862 1.239
Note:T h e t a b l e c o n t a i n s t h e e s t i m a t e s o f t h e m a r g i n a l e   e c t o f a o ne unit change in the speciﬁed
variable on the level of credit spreads (in percentage points) for noncallable and callable bonds based
on the parameter estimates reported in Table 4. All marginal e ects are evaluated at sample means;
by construction, the level, slope, and curvature factors ares t a n d a r d i z e dt oh a v em e a ne q u a lt oz e r o
and standard deviation equal to one. Asymptotic standard errors are computed according to the delta
method.
a Sample mean of the speciﬁed variable.
b Sample standard deviation of the speciﬁed variable.
As an alternative, we control directly for the e ects of the Treasury term structure
and interest rate volatility on the credit spreads of callable bonds when estimating the
excess bond premium. In addition to interacting the distance-to-default and the vector of
bond characteristics Zit[k]i ne q u a t i o n( 3 )w i t ht h eCALLi[k]i n d i c a t o r ,t h ec r e d i ts p r e a d so f
callable bonds are also allowed to depend on the level, slope,a n dc u r v a t u r eo ft h eT r e a s u r y
yield curve, the three factors that summarize the vast majority of the information in the
term structure, according to Litterman and Scheinkman [1991]; the credit spreads of callable
bonds can also be a ected by the realized monthly volatility of the daily 10-year Treasury
yield, a proxy for interest rate uncertainty.10
The results of this exercise are reported in the right panel of Table 4. As predicted by the
theory, an increase in the general level of interest rates andt h es t e e p e n i n go ft h eT r e a s u r y
term structure—the e ects captured by the level and slope factors, respectively—lead to a
narrowing of the credit spreads of callable bonds. In contrast, an increase in the realized
volatility of longer-term Treasury yields boosts the spreads of callable bonds. Importantly,
the inclusion of the term structure and volatility factors noticeably improves the ﬁt of the
credit-spread regression.
In Table 5, we translate the coe cients from the estimated log-spread pricing equation
into the impact of variation in default risk, the shape of the term structure, and interest
10The level, slope, and curvature factors correspond, respectively, to the ﬁrst three principal components
of nominal Treasury yields at 3-month, 6-month, 1-, 2-, 3-, 5-, 7-, 10-, 15-, and 30-year maturities. All yield
series are monthly (at month-end) and with the exception of the 3- and 6-month bill rates are derived from
the smoothed Treasury yield curve estimated by G¨ urkaynak eta l .[ 2 0 0 7 ] .
17Figure 3: Actual and Predicted Credit Spreads
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Note:S a m p l ep e r i o d :1 9 7 3 : M 1 – 2 0 1 0 : M 9 .T h es o l i dl i n ed e p i c t st h ea c t u a lG Zc r e d i ts p r e a d . T h e
dashed line depicts the predicted GZ credit spread based on the speciﬁcation that includes the term
structure option-adjustment terms; the dotted line depictst h ep r e d i c t e dG Zc r e d i ts p r e a db a s e do n
the speciﬁcation that excludes the term structure option-adjustment terms (see text for details). The
shaded vertical bars represent the NBER-dated recessions.
rate volatility on the level of credit spreads. In line with the theoretical predictions, the
e ect of default risk on the credit spreads of callable bonds is signiﬁcantly attenuated by
the call-option mechanism, with a one standard deviation decline in the distance-to-default
implying an increase of 29 basis points in the spreads of noncallable bonds, compared with
a1 3b a s i sp o i n t sr i s ei nt h es p r e a d so ft h e i rc a l l a b l ec o u n t e rparts.
Consistent with the results of Du ee [1998], our estimates also imply that the shape of
the Treasury term structure and interest rate volatility have economically signiﬁcant e ects
on the credit spreads of callable bonds. For example, a one standard deviation increase in
the level factor implies a reduction in the credit spreads on callable bonds of almost 80 basis
points, while a one standard deviation increase in the slope factor lowers credit spreads on
such bonds 18 basis points. An increase in the volatility of long-term interest rates—by
boosting the value of embedded call options—implies a widening of callable credit spreads
of 27 basis points.
Figure 3 shows the GZ credit spread along with the ﬁtted valuesf r o mt w os p e c i ﬁ c a t i o n s :
one that includes the e ects of the term structure terms on credit spreads of callable bonds
and one that does not. Over most of our sample period, the option adjustment for callable
18Figure 4: The Excess Bond Premium









Note:S a m p l ep e r i o d :1 9 7 3 : M 1 – 2 0 1 0 : M 9 .T h eﬁ g u r ed e p i c t st h ee s t imated (option-adjusted) excess
bond premium. The shaded vertical bars represent the NBER-dated recessions.
bonds has had relatively little e ect. One exception is the 1979–82 period of nonborrowed
reserves targeting, a period characterized by a substantialv o l a t i l i t yi nn o m i n a li n t e r e s tr a t e s .
Given that most of the bonds in our sample during that period were callable, increased
interest rate volatility implies a higher ﬁtted average spread, relative to the ﬁtted value that
does not control for interest rate volatility; in addition, the excessive volatility of credit
spreads during this period implies more volatile ﬁtted values.
The option adjustment also had a signiﬁcant e ect during the recent ﬁnancial crisis,
reﬂecting the fact that the general level of interest rates fell to historically low levels. Because
al o wl e v e lo fi n t e r e s tr a t e si m p l i e sh i g h e rp r e d i c t e dv a l u e sf o rt h ec r e d i ts p r e a d so fc a l l a b l e
bonds, our option-adjustment procedure accounts for about 200 basis points of the total
increase in the GZ credit spread during the height of the ﬁnancial crisis in the autumn
of 2008. Overall, the ﬁtted values from this speciﬁcation capture a substantial fraction of
cyclical ﬂuctuations in the GZ credit spread.
Figure 4 shows the estimated excess bond premium—that is, thed i   e r e n c eb e t w e e nt h e
GZ credit spread and the ﬁtted value from the second speciﬁcation in Table 4. With the
exception of the 1990–91 recession, the premium increased signiﬁcantly prior to or during
all cyclical downturns. The excess bond premium fell to a historically low level in the latter
part of 2003 and remained low during the following several years, the period that, at least
19in retrospect, has been characterized by lax credit standards, excessive credit growth, and
unsustainable asset price appreciation.
The intensiﬁcation of credit concerns in U.S. and foreign ﬁnancial markets during the
summer of 2007 precipitated a sharp increase in the excess bond premium, which continued
to increase throughout the subsequent ﬁnancial crisis, reaching a record high of 275 basis
points in October 2008. Although conditions in ﬁnancial markets improved somewhat over
the remainder of 2008, investors’ concern in early 2009 aboutt h ev i a b i l i t yo fm a j o rﬁ n a n c i a l
institutions led to another surge in the excess bond premium.S i n c e t h e n , t h i s g a u g e o f
ﬁnancial disruptions has reversed all of its run-up, a pattern consistent with the improved
economic outlook and the easing of strains in ﬁnancial markets.
5T h e E x c e s s B o n d P r e m i u m a n d E c o n o m i c A c t i v i t y
Our decomposition of the GZ credit spread implies that an important component of the vari-
ation in corporate credit spreads is due to ﬂuctuations in thee x c e s sb o n dp r e m i u m .W en o w
examine whether movements in the excess bond premium providei n d e p e n d e n ti n f o r m a t i o n
about future economic activity. First, we analyze the extentt ow h i c ht h ef o r e c a s t i n gp o w e r
of the GZ credit spread documented in Section 3 is attributable to its predicted component
or the excess bond premium. We then add the excess bond premiumt oa no t h e r w i s es t a n -
dard macroeconomic VAR and examine the implications of innovations to the excess bond
premium for the real economy and asset prices.
5.1 Forecasting Results
Table 6 reports the results for the monthly indicators of economic activity, based on the
speciﬁcation in which the two components of the GZ credit spread—  S
GZ and EBP —are
allowed to enter the forecasting regression (2) separately. According to our estimates, both
the excess bond premium and the predicted GZ credit spread contain signiﬁcant independent
explanatory power for all three economic indicators, at botht h e3 -a n d1 2 - m o n t hf o r e c a s t
horizons. However, the (absolute) magnitude of the estimatedc o e   c i e n t so nt h ee x c e s s
bond premium tends to be signiﬁcantly larger than that of the coe cients associated with
the predicted GZ spread, a ﬁnding indicating that the information content of credit spreads
for economic activity largely reﬂects ﬂuctuations in the non-default component of credit
spreads as opposed to movements in expected defaults.
20Table 6: The Excess Bond Premium and Monthly Measures of Economic Activity
Forecast Horizon: 3 months Forecast Horizon: 12 months
Financial Indicator EMP UER IPM EMP UER IPM
Term spread -0.122 0.221 -0.256 -0.291 0.440 -0.435
[2.67] [10.3] [3.60] [5.78] [55.4] [4.99]
Real FFR -0.044 0.007 -0.018 -0.112 0.022 -0.079
[0.87] [0.30] [0.23] [2.06] [2.70] [0.81]
Predicted GZ spreada -0.202 0.134 -0.186 -0.355 0.213 -0.283
[5.65] [8.41] [3.62] [9.63] [38.5] [4.18]
Excess bond premium -0.259 0.331 -0.386 -0.369 0.414 -0.388
[8.52] [20.9] [5.87] [14.5] [91.6] [5.42]
Adj. R2 0.687 0.430 0.381 0.588 0.433 0.384
Note:S a m p l e p e r i o d :1 9 7 3 : M 1 – 2 0 1 0 : M 9 .D e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e i s  hYt+h,w h e r eYt denotes an
indicator of economic activity in month t and h is the forecast horizon: EMP = private nonfarm payroll
employment; UER = civilian unemployment rate; and IPM = indexo fm a n u f a c t u r i n gi n d u s t r i a l
production. In addition to the speciﬁed ﬁnancial indicatorsi nm o n t ht,e a c hs p e c i ﬁ c a t i o na l s oi n c l u d e s
ac o n s t a n ta n dp lags of  Yt 1 (not reported), where p is determined by the AIC. Entries in the table
denote the standardized estimates of the OLS coe cients associated with each ﬁnancial indicator;
absolute asymptotic t-statistics reported in brackets are computed according to Hodrick [1992] (see
text for details).
a Excludes the e ect of option adjustment on callable bonds.
In Table 7, we repeat this forecasting exercise for the growthr a t eo fr e a lG D Pa n di t s
main components. To conserve space, we report the results fort h e4 - q u a r t e rf o r e c a s th o r i z o n
only. We do, however, perform an important robustness check by performing the analysis
for the 1985–2010 subsample, a period characterized by a stable monetary policy regime and
by signiﬁcant deregulation of ﬁnancial markets.11
As indicated in the ﬁrst column of the top panel of Table 7, the excess bond premium
is economically and statistically a highly signiﬁcant predictor of output growth at the year-
ahead forecast horizon over the full sample period. The coe cient estimate implies that
an increase in the excess bond premium of 100 basis points in quarter t leads to a drop
in real GDP growth of more than 1.5 percentage points over the subsequent four quarters.
Consistent with our previous ﬁndings, the impact on economicg r o w t ho fas i m i l a r l y - s i z e d
move in the predicted component of the GZ credit spread is considerably smaller—a 100 basis
point increase implies a deceleration in output of only 0.5 percentage points.
11Formal statistical tests of the stability of the forecastingr e g r e s s i o nf u n c t i o nd oi n d i c a t eap o s s i b l e
structural break in the coe cients associated with ﬁnancial indicators—most notably for the coe cient on
the real federal funds rate. Given the well-documented change in the monetary policy operating procedures
that took place during the late 1970s and the early 1980s, splitting the sample in 1985 thus provides a natural
point to examine the robustness of our results across di erent sample periods.
21Table 7: The Excess Bond Premium, Real GDP, and its Main Components
Sample Period: 1973:Q1–2010:Q3 (Forecast Horizon: 4 quarters)
Financial Indicator GDP C-NDS C-D I-RES I-ES I-HT I-NRS INV
Term spread -0.478 -0.452 -0.551 -0.564 -0.398 -0.098 0.317 -0.123
[3.33] [3.89] [2.55] [5.23] [3.16] [0.83] [2.73] [1.43]
Real FFR -0.036 0.106 0.106 -0.003 -0.086 -0.092 -0.111 0.014
[0.24] [0.99] [0.58] [0.03] [0.82] [0.67] [0.87] [0.15]
Predicted GZ spreada -0.258 -0.209 0.014 -0.159 -0.221 -0.426 -0.186 -0.287
[2.56] [2.39] [0.11] [2.10] [2.48] [4.43] [2.07] [4.11]
Excess bond premium -0.364 -0.260 -0.127 -0.018 -0.558 -0.374 -0.587 -0.656
[5.36] [4.36] [1.00] [0.29] [5.87] [4.42] [5.77] [9.39]
Adj. R2 0.365 0.349 0.224 0.419 0.481 0.432 0.557 0.580
Sample Period: 1985:Q1–2010:Q3 (Forecast Horizon: 4 quarters)
Financial Indicator GDP C-NDS C-D I-RES I-ES I-HT I-NRS INV
Term spread -0.509 -0.362 -0.456 -0.596 -0.340 -0.071 0.392 -0.321
[4.09] [4.07] [2.00] [6.52] [2.75] [0.60] [2.46] [4.08]
Real FFR 0.424 0.181 0.395 0.331 0.032 -0.130 -0.000 0.301
[2.67] [1.53] [1.49] [2.96] [0.18] [0.90] [0.00] [2.47]
Predicted GZ spreada -0.023 -0.093 0.194 0.045 -0.088 -0.294 -0.061 -0.047
[0.20] [0.82] [0.99] [0.47] [0.63] [2.11] [0.49] [0.46]
Excess bond premium -0.501 -0.362 -0.260 -0.035 -0.650 -0.382 -0.613 -0.701
[6.80] [5.02] [1.51] [0.50] [5.41] [3.39] [4.76] [8.20]
Adj. R2 0.357 0.508 0.101 0.484 0.448 0.405 0.624 0.635
Note:D e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l ei s 4Yt+4,w h e r eYt denotes real GDP or one of its components in quarter t;C - N D S=P C E
on nondurable goods & services; C-D = PCE on durable goods; I-RES = residential investment; I-ES = business ﬁxed
investment in E&S (excl. high tech); I-HT = business ﬁxed investment in high-tech equipment; I-NRS = business ﬁxed
investment in structures; INV = business inventories. In addition to the speciﬁed ﬁnancial indicators in quarter t,e a c h
speciﬁcation also includes a constant and p lags of  Yt 1 (not reported), where p is determined by the AIC. Entries in the
table denote the standardized estimates of the OLS coe cients associated with each ﬁnancial indicator; absolute asymptotic
t-statistics reported in brackets are computed according to Hodrick [1992] (see text for details).
a Excludes the e ect of option adjustment on callable bonds.
2
2The remaining columns in the top panel focus on the main categories of personal con-
sumption expenditures and private investment. The excess bond premium has substantial
predictive content for the growth of consumption spending onn o n d u r a b l e sa n ds e r v i c e s ,t h e
major components of business ﬁxed investment, as well as for inventory accumulation, an
especially volatile component of aggregate demand. With thee x c e p t i o no fh i g h – t e c hi n v e s t -
ment, the coe cients on the predicted component of the GZ spread are considerably smaller
(in absolute value) than the respective coe cients on the excess bond premium, again in-
dicating that movements in the excess bond premium have, in economic terms, a greater
impact on aggregate economic activity. In fact, for the most cyclically volatile series such
as inventory investment and spending on E&S and nonresidential structures, the economic
impact of the excess bond premium is more than twice as large ast h a to ft h ep r e d i c t e d
component of the GZ credit spread.
As shown in the bottom panel, the predictive content of the excess bond premium for
economic activity over the 1985–2010 period is, if anything,g r e a t e rt h a nt h a to b t a i n e d
for the full sample period. The forecasting ability of the excess bond premium over the
latter subsample is especially striking in the case of real GDP growth. According to our
estimates, the predicted component of the GZ credit spread has no forecasting power for the
growth of real GDP since the mid-1980s, while the excess bond premium continues to provide
economically and statistically highly signiﬁcant signals regarding economic growth prospects.
In general, the coe cients on the excess bond premium estimated over this subperiod are
noticeably higher (in absolute value) than those reported int h et o pp a n e l . T h ee s t i m a t e s
based on the 1985–2010 period imply that a 100 basis points increase in the excess bond
premium in quarter t lowers output about 2.0 percentage points over the next four quarters.
In summary, the above analysis indicates that the excess bondp r e m i u mi sar o b u s t
predictor of economic activity. This ﬁnding holds true across a variety of economic indicators,
short- and longer-term forecast horizons, and sample periods. Furthermore, our forecasting
results imply that since the mid-1980s, most of the predictive content of the GZ credit spread
for economic activity can be attributed to variation in the excess bond premium rather than
to variation in default risk, as measured by its predicted component.
5.2 Macroeconomic Implications
In this section, we examine the macroeconomic consequences of shocks to the excess bond
premium. We do so by adding the excess bond premium to a standard VAR that includes
the following endogenous variables: (1) log-di erence of real personal consumption expendi-
23tures (PCE); (2) log-di erence of real business ﬁxed investment (BFI); (3) log-di erence of
real GDP; (4) inﬂation as measured by the log-di erence of theG D Pp r i c ed e ﬂ a t o r ;( 5 )t h e
quarterly average of the excess bond premium; (6) the quarterly value-weighted excess stock
market return from CRSP; (7) the 10-year (nominal) Treasury yield; and (8) the e ective
(nominal) federal funds rate. The identifying assumption implied by this recursive ordering
is that shocks to the excess bond premium a ect economic activity and inﬂation with a
lag, while the risk-free rates and stock prices can react contemporaneously to such a ﬁnan-
cial disturbance; the VAR is estimated over the full sample period, using two lags of each
endogenous variable.
Figure 5 depicts the impulse response functions of the endogenous variables to an or-
thogonalized shock to the excess bond premium. An unanticipated increase of one standard
deviation in the excess bond premium—about 20 basis points—causes a signiﬁcant reduc-
tion in real economic activity, with consumption, investment, and output all falling over the
next several quarters. The macroeconomic consequences of this adverse ﬁnancial shock are
substantial; the level of real GDP bottoms out about 0.5 percentage points below trend ﬁve
quarters after the shock, while the drop in investment is muchm o r es e v e r ea n dp e r s i s t e n t .
The resulting economic slack leads to a substantial disinﬂation over time. In response to
these adverse economic developments, monetary policy is eased signiﬁcantly, as evidenced
by the decline in the federal funds rate that commences about one quarter after the initial
impact of the shock. Despite the reduction in the overnight policy rate and the associated
decline in longer-term yields, the stock market experiencesas i g n i ﬁ c a n td r o p ,w i t hc u m u l a t i v e
decline of about 7.0 percentage points relative to trend growth.
Figure 6 shows the amount of variation in the endogenous variables explained by the
orthogonalized shocks to the excess bond premium. These innovations account for more
than 10 percent of the variation in output and 25 percent of thev a r i a t i o ni nb u s i n e s sﬁ x e d
investment at business cycle frequencies, proportions thate x c e e dt h ea m o u n to fv a r i a t i o n
typically explained by monetary policy shocks. In addition,s h o c k st ot h ee x c e s sb o n d
premium explain a signiﬁcant portion of the variation in broad equity valuations.
24Figure 5: Macroeconomic Implications of a Shock to the ExcessB o n dP r e m i u m
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Note:T h eﬁ g u r ed e p i c t st h ei m p u l s er e s p o n s e st oa1s t a n d a r dd e v i ation orthogonalized shock to the
excess bond premium (see text for details). The responses of consumption, investment, and output
growth and that of the excess market return have been accumulated. Shaded bands denote 95-percent
conﬁdence intervals based on 2,000 bootstrap replications.
25Figure 6: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
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Note:T h e ﬁ g u r e d e p i c t s t h e f o r e c a s t e r r o r v a r i a n c e d e c o m p o s i t i on from a 1 standard deviation
orthogonalized shock to the excess bond premium (see text ford e t a i l s ) .T h ef o r e c a s te r r o rv a r i a n c e
decomposition of consumption, investment, and output growth and that of the excess market return
is based on the level of the variables. Shaded bands denote 95-percent conﬁdence intervals based on
2,000 bootstrap replications.
265.3 Interpretation
The macroeconomic dynamics reported above are consistent with the notion that the excess
bond premium provides a timely and useful gauge of credit supply conditions. A reduction
in the supply of credit—an increase in the excess bond premium—causes a drop in asset
prices and a contraction in economic activity through the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanisms
emphasized by Bernanke and Gertler [1989], Kiyotaki and Moore [1997], Bernanke et al.
[1999], and Hall [2010]. Our ﬁndings also provide empirical support for the recent work of
Gertler and Kiyotaki [2009] and Gertler and Karadi [2010], who introduce macroeconomic
models in which shocks to the value of assets held by ﬁnancial intermediaries—by reducing
the supply of credit—have independent e ects on the real economy.
Given the inherent asymmetric feature of debt contracts, ourr e s u l t sc o u l da l s or e ﬂ e c tt h e
fact that prices of corporate bonds—compared with equity prices—are able to better capture
the downside risks to economic growth. Thus, ﬂuctuations in the excess bond premium may
be due in part to a small but time-varying risk of economic “disasters.” As shown recently
by Gourio [2010], a small increase in the probability of such an extreme event can cause a
collapse in investment in a canonical real business cycle framework, vis-` a-vis a sharp increase
in the risk premium that signiﬁcantly boosts the cost of capital.
To the extent that ﬁnancial disturbances alter risk perceptions in ﬁnancial markets,
changing risk attitudes of the marginal investors pricing corporate bonds may also inﬂuence
ab r o a d e rs u p p l yo fc r e d i t .B ya n dl a r g e ,t h ec o r p o r a t eb o n dm arket is dominated by institu-
tional investors such as large banks, insurance companies, and pension funds, intermediaries
that possess specialized knowledge about the corporate bondm a r k e ta n di nm a n yc a s e sa r e
highly leveraged. These investors also face either explicito ri m p l i c i tc a p i t a lr e q u i r e m e n t s ,
and as their ﬁnancial capital becomes impaired, they act in a more risk-averse manner. This
reduction in their e ective risk-bearing capacity leads to an increase in the excess bond pre-
mium and a reduction in the supply of credit available to potential borrowers—both within
the corporate cash market and through other sources of external ﬁnance—resulting in the
type of asset market dynamics analyzed by He and Krishnamurthy [2010] and Adrian et al.
[2010a,b].
Suggestive evidence supporting the link between the excess bond premium and risk at-
titudes and balance sheet conditions of ﬁnancial intermediaries is provided in Figure 7.
Panel (a) plots the excess bond premium against the di usion index of the change in credit
standards on commercial and industrial (C&I) loans at U.S. commercial banks obtained from
the Federal Reserve’s quarterly Senior Loan O cer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Prac-
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(b) Financial Sector Proﬁtability and the Excess Bond Premium
Note:S a m p l e p e r i o d :1 9 7 3 : M 1 – 2 0 1 0 : M 9 .T h e s o l i d l i n e i n b o t h p a n els depicts the estimated
(option-adjusted) excess bond premium. The overlayed dots in panel (a) depict the net percent
of SLOOS respondents that reported tightening their credit standards on C&I loans over the past
three months. (There was no survey conducted during the 1984-89 period.) The overlayed dots in
panel (b) depict the quarterly (annualized) ROA for the U.S. ﬁnancial corporate sector, calculated
using Compustat data. The shaded vertical bars denote the NBER-dated recessions.
tices (SLOOS).12 The correlation between these two series—one obtained from aq u a l i t a t i v e
12The SLOOS is usually conducted four times per year by the Federal Reserve Board, and up to 60 banks
28survey of commercial banks and the other obtained from marketp r i c e s — i ss t r i k i n g l yh i g h ,
especially in the latter part of our sample.
Panel (b) highlights the link between the excess bond premiuma n dt h ep r o ﬁ t a b i l i t yo f
the U.S. ﬁnancial corporate sector as measured by its return on assets (ROA). Note that
periods of elevated proﬁtability are consistently associated with low levels of the excess bond
premium, while the declines in ROA are mirrored by sharp increases in the excess bond
premium. These comovements are consistent with the view thato u rp r o x yf o rt h ep r i c e
of default risk responds to changes in the risk attitudes of ﬁnancial intermediaries, at least
as reﬂected in their willingness to make C&I loans and changesi nt h ec o n d i t i o n so ft h e i r
balance sheets.
The 2007–09 ﬁnancial crisis o ers a unique opportunity to explore this hypothesis further.
Given that the origin of the crisis can undoubtedly be traced to the ﬁnancial sector (e.g.,
Brunnermeier [2009] and Gorton [2009]), we collected market-based data on the health of the
ﬁnancial sector, namely, the credit default swaps and equityv a l u a t i o n so fp r i m a r yd e a l e r s ,
major banks and securities broker-dealers that trade in U.S. Government securities with the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. By buying and selling an arrayo fs e c u r i t i e sf o raf e e
and holding an inventory of securities for resale, these highly leveraged ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries play a key role in most ﬁnancial markets. As documented by Adrian and Shin [2010],
broker-dealers di er from other types of institutional investors by their active pro-cyclical
management of leverage: Expansions in broker-dealer assetsa r ea s s o c i a t e dw i t hi n c r e a s e s
in leverage as broker-dealers take advantage of greater balance sheet capacity; conversely,
contractions in their asset holdings are associated with thed e - l e v e r a g i n go ft h e i rb a l a n c e
sheets.
The solid line in Figure 8 depicts the excess bond premium, while the overlayed dotted
line represents the average 1-year CDS spread for these institutions. The striking degree of
comovement between the two series over the period shown agains u p p o r t st h ei n t e r p r e t a t i o n
that the excess bond premium ﬂuctuates closely in response tom o v e m e n t si nc a p i t a la n d
balance sheet conditions of key ﬁnancial intermediaries.13 Indeed, the collapse of Lehman
Brothers on September 15, 2008—a watershed event in the recent crisis—provides a dramatic
participate in each survey. Banks are asked to report whethert h e yh a v ec h a n g e dt h e i rc r e d i ts t a n d a r d s
over the past three months on the major categories of loans to businesses and households. The series
plotted is the net percentage of banks that reported tightening their credit standards on C&I loans to large
and middle-market ﬁrms. Reported net percent equals the percent of banks that reported tightening their
standards minus the percent that reported easing their standards. For the full text of the questions and
more information on the survey, see http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SnLoanSurvey/.
13Prior to 2003, only a small subset of broker-dealers had CDS contracts traded in the market.
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Note:S a m p l ep e r i o d :2 0 0 3 : M 1 – 2 0 1 0 : M 9 .T h es o l i dl i n ed e p i c t st h ee s t i m a t e de x c e s sb o n d
premium. The overlayed dotted line depicts the average 1-year CDS spread of broker-dealers.
The shaded vertical bar represents the 2007–09 NBER-dated recession.
example of how disruptions in the e ective risk-bearing capacity of the ﬁnancial sector can
inﬂuence the supply of credit.
To analyze more formally how shocks to the proﬁtability of ﬁnancial intermediaries a ect
our gauge of credit supply conditions, we estimate a VAR, consisting of the option-implied
volatility on the S&P 500 (VIX), the (value-weighted) excess market return, the (value-
weighted) excess portfolio return of broker-dealers, the average 1- and 5-year broker-dealer
CDS spreads, and the excess bond premium. By including both the 1- and 5-year CDS
spreads, we allow such ﬁnancial shocks to a ect the market assessment of near- and longer-
term default risk for these institutions. The VAR, using threel a g so fe a c he n d o g e n o u s
variable, is estimated over the 2003:M1–2010:M9 period and also includes a dummy variable
for September 2008.14
Within this multivariate framework, we trace out the impact of an orthogonalized shock
to the excess return of broker-dealers, an innovation that, according to our identiﬁcation
scheme, is uncorrelated with contemporaneous movements in the broad stock market and
stock market volatility. The impulse responses shown in Figure 9 indicate that such an
adverse shock to the proﬁtability of these key ﬁnancial intermediaries leads to an immediate
14Standard regression diagnostics revealed that this observation exerted an unduly large inﬂuence on the
estimated coe cients.
30Figure 9: Implications of a Shock to the Proﬁtability of Financial Intermediaries
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Note:T h eﬁ g u r ed e p i c t st h ei m p u l s er e s p o n s e st oan e g a t i v eo n es t andard deviation orthogonalized
shock to the average excess return of broker-dealers (see text for details). Shaded bands denote
95-percent conﬁdence intervals based on 2,000 bootstrap replications.
rise in their near- and longer-term CDS spreads. Moreover, CDS spreads continue to widen
for about three months after the initial impact, and they return only very gradually to
their steady-state values. This persistent deterioration in investor assessment of the broker-
dealers’ creditworthiness is manifested by a sustained increase in the excess bond premium,
the response of which is very close to that of the 1-year CDS spread, likely the most accurate
market-based indicator of near-term default risk in the ﬁnancial sector.
Taken together, the evidence presented above is consistent with the view that systematic
deviations in the pricing of corporate bonds relative to the expected default risk of the
underlying issuer reﬂect shifts in the e ective risk aversion of the ﬁnancial sector. Increases
in risk aversion lead to a decline in asset prices and a contraction in the supply of credit,
both through the corporate bond market and the broader commercial banking sector, factors
31that contribute signiﬁcantly to a resulting slowdown in economic activity.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper examined the role that credit spreads play in determining macroeconomic out-
comes. We did so by constructing a new corporate bond credit spread index—the GZ credit
spread—employing an extensive micro-level data set of secondary market prices of outstand-
ing senior unsecured bonds issued by a large panel of U.S. nonﬁnancial corporation. Com-
pared with the widely-used default-risk indicators, the GZ credit spread was shown to be a
robust predictor of future economic activity across a variety of economic indicator, short-
and longer-term forecast horizons, and sample periods.
Using a ﬂexible empirical framework, we then decomposed the GZc r e d i ts p r e a di n t o
two parts: a component reﬂecting the available ﬁrm-speciﬁc information on default risk
and a residual component—the excess bond premium—that we argued plausibly represents
variation in the pricing of default risk, rather than in the risk of default. According to our
results, most of the predictive power of the GZ credit spread is accounted for by movements
in the excess bond premium—indeed, over the 1985–2010 period, the excess bond premium
accounts for all of the predictive content of the GZ credit spread for output growth.
Innovations to the excess bond premium that are orthogonal tot h ec u r r e n ts t a t eo ft h e
economy were shown to cause substantial and protracted contractions in economic activity,
an appreciable disinﬂation, a decline in both short and long-term risk-free rates, and a fall in
the broad stock market. In turn, these shocks to the excess bond premium were linked to the
deterioration in the proﬁtability and creditworthiness of broker-dealers, marginal investors
in the corporate debt market. All told, our ﬁndings are consistent with the notion that an
increase in the excess bond premium reﬂects a reduction in thee   e c t i v er i s k - b e a r i n gc a p a c i t y
of the ﬁnancial sector and, as a result, a contraction in the supply of credit with signiﬁcant
adverse consequences for the macroeconomy.
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